From evidence-based to decision-analytic medicine: A mammography case study by Madan, J.
 - 1 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HEDS Discussion Paper 08/08 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: 
This is a Discussion Paper produced and published by the Health Economics 
and Decision Science (HEDS) Section at the School of Health and Related 
Research (ScHARR), University of Sheffield.  HEDS Discussion Papers are 
intended to provide information and encourage discussion on a topic in 
advance of formal publication.  They represent only the views of the authors, 
and do not necessarily reflect the views or approval of the sponsors. 
 
White Rose Repository URL for this paper: 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/10906/ 
 
Once a version of Discussion Paper content is published in a peer-reviewed 
journal, this typically supersedes the Discussion Paper and readers are invited 
to cite the published version in preference to the original version. 
 
Published paper 
None. 
 
White Rose Research Online 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 2 - 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Health Economics and Decision Science 
Discussion Paper Series 
 
    No. 08/08 
 
 
 
From evidence-based to decision-analytic medicine: A 
mammography case study.  
 
 
Jason Madan1 
1 Health Economics and Decision Science, School of Health and Related Research, University of 
Sheffield 
 
Corresponding author:  
Jason Madan 
Health Economics and Decision Science, 
School of Health and Related Research 
University of Sheffield  
Regent Court  
30 Regent Street  
Sheffield  
S1 4DA  
UK 
Tel: 0114 222 0827 
Fax: 0114 222 4095 
Email: j.madan@sheffield.ac.uk 
This series is intended to promote discussion and to provide information about work 
in progress. The views expressed in this series are those of the authors, and should not 
be quoted without their permission. Comments are welcome, and should be sent to the 
corresponding author. 
 
ScHARR 
Acknowledgements 
 
The author is the recipient of a Researcher Development Award from the Department 
of Health National Co-ordinating Centre for Research Capacity Development. This 
award is funding work towards a PhD supervised by Dr. Jonathon Karnon, including 
the work presented here. The author would also like to thank Paul Tappenden and Dr. 
Paul Sutcliffe for their helpful comments. The views expressed are the author’s own. 
 
Abstract 
 
The technology needed to implement mass screening by mammography existed well 
before the implementation of national screening programmes. This delay arose partly 
because of the complexities involved in conducting randomised controlled trials 
(RCTs) of screening programmes. These complexities not only extend the time 
needed to conduct trials of cancer screening, they reduce the external validity of the 
results. There is potential to improve the application of evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) to the evaluation of cancer screening programmes and other complex 
interventions through adding insights from Operational Research and Decision 
Theory. This would extend EBM to what might be called Decision-Analytic Medicine 
(DAM).  
 A brief history of x-ray mammography and its evaluation 
 
 
The first use of x-rays to view tumours in the breast, in 1913, is credited to Albert 
Solomon, a German surgeon 1. Interest in x-ray mammography as a diagnostic tool 
began to develop in the 1930s. By the late 1950s, Robert Egan and colleagues in the 
U.S.A. were able to present data illustrating the potential of x-ray mammography in 
detecting asymptomatic breast tumours. 
 
A combination of technological ability and cultural acceptability led to growing calls, 
at least in the U.S.A, for mass screening programmes based on mammography 2. By 
the early 1960s, the use of controlled clinical trials to evaluate new interventions was 
established. Philip Strax, a radiologist with the Health Insurance Plan (HIP) of New 
York, proposed carrying out a clinical trial of mammography on members of HIP. 
This trial, the first of mammography, was carried out between 1963 and 1968. Results 
from the trial began to appear in the early 1970s, and they suggested that 
mammography could reduce breast cancer mortality by around 30% 3. 
 
The broadly positive results of the HIP trial were one factor in placing mass screening 
by mammography on the public health agenda in the 1970s. In the US, the diagnosis 
of prominent individuals (e.g. Betty Ford and Margaretta Rockefeller) with breast 
cancer raised awareness of the disease, and interest in diagnosis, significantly 4. The 
promise shown by the HIP trial spurred improvements in technology such as the 
single emulsion film, introduced by DuPont in 1972 5. The American Cancer Society 
(ACS), responding positively to the findings of the HIP trial, inaugurated the Breast 
Cancer Detection Demonstration project (BCDDP) jointly with the National Cancer 
Institute. The BCDDP was essentially the pilot for a national mammography 
screening programme. 
 
From the 70s onwards, further trials of mass screening were carried out in the UK, 
Sweden and Canada (Table 1.1).  A consensus began to emerge that mass screening 
by mammography was of benefit for at least some age groups. From the mid-80s 
onwards, a number of countries began to implement national screening programmes. 
In 1988, the International Breast Cancer Screening Database Project, subsequently 
renamed the International Breast Screening Network (IBSN), was established. The 
IBSN is a voluntary consortium of countries that have active population-based 
screening mammography programs. Currently, 27 countries participate in the IBSN. 
A 1995 survey of 22 countries carried out by the organisation 6 showed that 19 had 
begun organised mass screening programmes, and 9 had, or planned to have, national 
coverage by 2000. 
 
 
 
Study Year 
Started 
Age at 
entry 
(years) 
Number of women Number of breast cancer 
deaths after 13 years of 
follow-up 
   Control Intervention Control Intervention 
New York 
HIP 
1963 40-64 30,239 30,756 218 262 
Swedish two-
counties 
1977 40-74 78,085 56,782 261 277 
Malmo 1976 45-69 21,088 21,195 87 108 
Edinburgh 1979 45-64 23,226 21,904 176 187 
Stockholm 1981 40-64 40,318 19,943 66 45 
Canadian 
NBSS 
1980 40-59 44,925 44,910 212 213 
Goteborg 1982 40-59 21,650 29,961 88 162 
All Studies   259,531 225,451  1,108 1,254 
Table 1.1 Randomised clinical trials of screening by mammography 5, 7 
 
 
Breast cancer is a major source of mortality and morbidity across the world. There is 
an understandably high level of awareness of its effects, and public support behind 
any intervention that counteracts these effects. By 1963, the technology of 
mammography was considered sufficiently promising to justify the first RCT of its 
effectiveness as a screening tool. However, 35 years later, 13 out of 22 countries 
surveyed did not have a mammography programme with national coverage in place. 
Could, and should, such screening programmes have been implemented earlier? This 
question will be a key motivation for the research presented in this thesis.  
 
There is a broad consensus on the existence of benefit from screening by 
mammography. However, there has been an ongoing debate on how far that benefit 
goes, and some dissenters have taken a more sceptical view on mammography than 
others. In the next section, I take a brief look at this debate. 
 The debate over mass screening by mammography 
 
The BCDDP was an uncontrolled pilot rather than a controlled study, and there were 
those who argued that its implementation was premature. One of the most prominent 
critics of the speed with which mass screening by mammography was being 
implemented in the USA was John Bailar. Bailar was a clinician, biostatistician, and 
the NCI Deputy Director for Cancer Control. He argued that the HIP had not 
conclusively demonstrated the benefits of screening mammography, citing the 
possibility of lead time and length bias in the results 8.  
 
Bailar also cited reasons why screening might not be as efficacious as its proponents 
hoped. These reasons lie at the heart of many sceptical positions on cancer screening 
programmes. The first reason was that many of the lesions detected by screening 
would be slow-growing and clinically unthreatening. Detecting them would therefore 
lead to over-treatment. The second reason was that screening could also cause harm. 
This harm includes physical effects such as increased incidence of cancer from 
radiation exposure, and mental harm e.g. the needless anxiety generated by false 
positives.  
 
Whilst Bailar, amongst others, argued that the benefits of mammography screening 
were unproven in general, he was particularly sceptical about its value in the under 
50s. Mammography is generally less effective in the pre-menopausal breast, as it 
tends to be denser. When stratified into age cohorts, the results of the HIP trial did not 
demonstrate a statistically significant survival improvement in the under 50s.  
 
However, a number of issues continued to be debated. One was the frequency of 
screening. In the UK, for example, the national screening programme operates once 
every three years. In the US, screening is recommended every 1-2 years. 
[http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/3rduspstf/breastcancer/]. Also, the debate over screening 
the 40-49 age group continues to this day. The Canadian Task Force on Preventative 
Care, amongst others, argues that there is insufficient evidence to justify screening in 
this age group [http://www.ctfphc.org/]. In the US, however, the ACS currently 
recommends that women over 40 receive annual mammographies 9. 
 
The boundaries of consensus were shifted by the publication, in 2000, of a systematic 
(Cochrane) review and analysis of mammography RCTs 10, 11. The authors of the 
review argued that there were methodological flaws in the design of several of these 
RCTs, which could lead to biases in the results. For example, they argued that errors 
in recording the cause of death of participants could have systematically favoured 
screening. Crucially, they argued that the trials which had shown the least benefit 
from screening were also the trials where the methodology was strongest. They 
concluded that existing trials did not provide enough evidence to demonstrate 
conclusively that screening by mammography was effective. 
 
The publication of this Cochrane review lead to a resurgence in the mammography 
debate, both in the academic community and in the wider media 12. Many have 
responded to counter the criticisms raised by the review 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, whilst the 
authors have continued to defend their analysis, 18, 19, 20, supported by others 21. The 
original Cochrane review has been recently updated 7. This version moderates its 
conclusions, stating that it is likely that screening reduces breast cancer mortality, and 
that a reasonable estimate for the relative reduction is 15%. However, the authors go 
on to argue that this effect is small in absolute terms, and that (echoing Bailar) 
screening also leads to overdiagnosis and overtreatment. They state that 
 
 ‘It is thus not clear whether screening does more good than harm’ 7. 
 
There has been an extensive debate over the analysis presented in the Cochrane 
review, and it is not my aim to join in this debate. Instead, I would like to explore the 
following question. Despite 40 years of investigation, involving half a million women 
followed for up to 15 years, why have RCTs not been able to provide enough 
evidence for policy-makers to settle debates over the effectiveness of screening by 
mammography? 
 The Difficulties of Screening Trials 
 
 
 
“Randomised screening trials are bothersome … Still, such long-term large-scale randomised screening trials 
are crucial, and there is no second-best option”. 22 
 
The evidence based medicine (EBM) movement can be seen as an attempt to 
formalise the process of evaluation of medical treatments, and bring this process in 
line with other forms of scientific enquiry 23. A key part of the approach is the idea of 
hierarchies of evidence. The quality of a type of evidence relates to the scope for bias 
to skew the results. There are a wide range of effects that can generate misleading 
outcomes, including selection bias, placebo effects, and misreporting of outcomes. An 
advocate of EBM might argue that there is a natural tendency to place excessive 
weight on personal experiences and anecdote, and a further tendency to sometimes 
interpret results of studies in line with hopes and expectations. The application of 
EBM is an attempt to counter these tendencies. 
 
At the top of the hierarchy lies the randomised, double-blind, controlled trial (or, even 
better, a systematic review of such trials) 
http://www.cebm.net/levels_of_evidence.asp#levels. RCT evidence is highly regarded 
because this study design, if implemented well, eliminates most sources of systematic 
bias. For this reason, it is often referred to as the ‘gold standard’ of medical evidence. 
There are situations in which conducting RCTs is impractical or unethical. Sackett 
argues that: 
 
“Evidence based medicine is not restricted to randomised trials and meta-
analyses… if no randomised trial has been carried out for our patient's 
predicament, we must follow the trail to the next best external evidence and 
work from there.” 24. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a view, implicit in the hierarchy of evidence, and often eluded 
to in the literature, that the efficacy of an intervention cannot be considered settled 
until RCT evidence is available, and that such evidence should be obtained if at all 
possible.  
 
For a number of reasons, some interventions are difficult to evaluate by RCT. Mass 
population screening for cancer is an example of such a challenging area 22. An 
important reason for this is that the vast majority of participants will be disease-free, 
and so will not provide much information for the researcher. The result is that the 
RCT will need to be large to detect the affect of the screening tool. Power calculations 
are often performed to estimate the size of trial required to detect the expected 
effect… 
 
The aim of cancer screening is to reduce mortality from the disease. However, it can 
take considerable time for any such benefit to become apparent in the results of a trial. 
There can be a substantial delay between diagnosis and outcome for patients on both 
arms. Also, several rounds of screening, several years apart, may be needed before the 
benefits present themselves. This is the reason why cancer screening trials can often 
take a decade or more to complete.  
 
The combination of enormous size and lengthy follow-up leads to practical problems 
in conducting population cancer screening trials. Two of these problems are 
contamination and non-compliance 5. Contamination occurs when participants in the 
control group seek out screening outside the study. Non-compliance occurs when 
participants in the screening arm fail to attend one or more of their allotted screenings. 
Both contamination and non-compliance dilute the ability of a trial to detect the 
clinical benefit of screening. Therefore, if these are likely to be significant issues, the 
trial will need to be even larger, and the duration even longer, to detect the benefits of 
screening.  
 
The length of follow-up needed in trials of mass screening for cancer creates further 
dilemmas. There is a possibility that the screening technology will change over the 
duration of the trial. With mammography, there have been continual improvements in 
the technology (e.g. extended cycle processing 5) and in the implementation 
(computer-assisted reading, double-view). Where there have been improvements, this 
may not be a crucial issue, as investigators can argue that actual benefits will be at 
least as large as those identified in trials. However, if an entirely new screening 
technology is introduced, trials based on existing methods may provide limited 
information of value to decision-makers. 
 
There is a conceptual problem with the design of screening RCTs which is 
exacerbated by the time needed to carry them out. In isolation, screening provides no 
therapeutic benefits. It is in the impact of early detection on the choice and outcome 
of treatment where any such benefits lie. Therefore changes in the treatments 
available, or in their effectiveness, will affect the benefit of early detection. 
Participants of the trials listed in table 1.1 will have received treatment between the 
early 1960s and the mid 1990s. As we shall subsequently see, treatment options have 
changed radically during that time, and substantially since.  It is not intuitively 
obvious whether such changes will, in balance, benefit screen-detected cases more, 
less, or equally than clinically detected patients. 
 
It is usually not feasible to blind the doctor or the patient as to whether or not a trial 
participant has received screening. This can affect the validity of trial results in a 
number of ways. It is possible that knowing whether a patient has a symptomatic or 
screen-detected may influence treatment decisions unduly. Also, the process of 
undergoing screening may have a psychological impact on the participant, leading to 
changes in health-related behaviour. The participant may change her lifestyle in ways 
that reduces risk, and may also be more alert to the symptoms of breast cancer if it 
were to present between screenings.  
 
Many of these issues with the assessment of cancer screening programmes can be 
described as problems with external validity. External validity describes the extent to 
which an experimental result applies in the real world. In medicine, this means the 
extent to which the results of study reflect the consequences of introducing an 
intervention into clinical practice. Lack of consideration of external validity is the 
most frequent criticism by clinicians of RCTs 25.  There are several reasons why this 
is generally so. Ethnic differences and differences in health care systems may reduce 
the external validity of a study carried out in one country to the population of another. 
RCTs are often carried out by expert proponents of a new technology in idealised 
settings, so that results obtained in routine practice are not as favourable.  To reduce 
confounding, RCT protocols often place tight restrictions on the characteristics of 
participants. This leaves unclear how the results might generalise to a more 
heterogeneous population. Rothwell lists 39 factors that can reduce the external 
validity of a trial to a given clinical setting. 
 
Most of these factors undermining the external validity of RCTs in general apply 
specifically to trials of cancer screening programmes. In this section, I have put 
forward further reasons, specific to this type of intervention, why the results of an 
RCT might not reflect the outcomes of real-world implementation. Nevertheless, 
many would support the assertion of De Koning given at the beginning of this section; 
that RCTs are the only valid and conclusive source of evidence on which to base 
clinical policy, despite their occasional shortcomings. To challenge this view, it is 
necessary to look at the intellectual framework, or paradigm, underpinning it. This is 
the topic of the next section.  
Evidence Based Medicine as an application of the Scientific 
Method 
 
 
 
The term ‘evidence-based medicine’ has been criticised as too vague a description of 
the aims of its proponents 26. Any component practitioners would surely base their 
medical decisions on evidence. The key to EBM lies in the weight it puts on the 
quality of evidence in driving clinical decisions. To understand this fully, compare 
EBM to a stylised alternative which we might call ‘judgement-based medicine’ 
(JBM). In JBM, the clinician makes decisions based on his personal training and 
experience. JBM is still evidence-based, but relies on the expert and subjective 
judgement of the practitioner to interpret that evidence. In particular, doctors have the 
freedom to derive and evaluate their own conclusions from the evidence available to 
them.  
 
It could be argued that JBM is a crude, but not a fanciful, description of the approach 
to medicine pre-EBM. The problem JBM creates has been described already – it 
leaves space for several sources of bias to creep in, leading to sub-optimal treatment 
choices. EBM arose as a direct response to this problem, and that response involves 
the formal, systematic and objective collection of evidence to eliminate bias. The 
randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trial is the study design 
strongest at eliminating bias, and so it is given the highest position in the EBM 
hierarchy of evidence.  
 
EBM can therefore be seen as an attempt to compensate for the weaknesses of 
subjective human judgement with the objectivity of evidence obtained from rigourous 
experiment. This does not mean that it eliminates the need for expert judgement. 
Sackett describes EBM as  ‘integrating individual clinical expertise and the best 
external evidence’ 27. However, EBM does represent a bound to clinical freedom. In 
particular, it places a responsibility on the medical profession to choose treatments 
that have a formally approved evidence base, to justify why an evidence base does not 
apply to a particular patient, or to create that evidence base when it does not exist.  
 EBM, therefore, aims to ground the practice of medicine within the empirical 
scientific method. This method requires that theories be tested against carefully 
structured observations of the natural world. There are many characterisations of the 
scientific method, but it can be seen as a process with four components: 
· Observation: This stage involves study of the natural world in a search for 
patterns. For example, we might observe that a high proportion of patients 
with heart disease have furred arteries. 
· Hypothesis: From our observations, we try and draw general principles and 
conclusions. For example, our study of patients with heart disease might lead 
to the hypothesis that elevated blood cholesterol leads to furred arteries and 
increases the risk of a heart attack. 
· Prediction: Combining observations and hypotheses can lead to predictions. If 
we observe that a drug lowers cholesterol in laboratory conditions, we might 
combine this with the hypothesis created above to conclude that the drug will 
reduce the risk of a heart attack. 
· Testing: This key stage involves testing our prediction in a setting carefully 
controlled so that we can be sure any observations relate to the prediction we 
are testing. 
These four stages are an idealised formalisation of the process by which scientific 
knowledge advances.  
 
EBM is clearly an attempt to ensure that this last stage is carried out appropriately. It 
therefore equates clinical decision-making with the evaluation of a scientific 
hypothesis. The question ‘should patient X receive treatment A’ becomes a 
hypothesis, and the toolkit of hypothesis testing is applied – the creation of a null 
hypothesis, controlled hypothesis testing, and the analysis of results using frequentist 
tests of statistical significance. Seen in this light, clinical debate focuses on the 
question of whether the evidence is of sufficient quality and quantity to support the 
hypothesis. This can be seen clearly in the debate on mammography described above, 
which is largely a debate about the quality of the trials. 
 
The power of the scientific method is beyond dispute, as is particularly evident in the 
technologies of modern medicine. The aim of grounding medical practice in this 
method is therefore understandably attractive. However, medicine is more than a 
science; it is the application of science to an end. That end is the best use of medical 
resources (time and materials) in improving health. The ultimate aim of medical 
evidence is to guide treatment choices rather than establish scientific truths.  
 
Why might it be necessary to differentiate between these two aims that would seem to 
go hand-in-hand? The answer lies in the earlier discussion about the external validity 
of an RCT. Where external validity is an issue, there is a knowledge gap between the 
results of the trial and the answer to the question of how to treat a particular patient or 
group of patients. The results of the RCT help answer the latter question, but they 
may not provide the answer. We have seen that this is a particular issue in assessing 
cancer screening programmes. As well as the standard sources of external validity 
issues, we have the complication of accounting for changing treatment patterns and 
screening technologies over time. There is also the issue of predicting the 
effectiveness for varying age cohorts and screening cycle frequencies.  
 
Where the problem of external validity is significant, as it appears to be in cancer 
screening, the solution might be to rely on clinical expertise to bridge the ‘knowledge 
gap’. Yet this returns us to the issues of subjectivity EBM is designed to combat. In 
particular, it can lead to the difficult situation where experts disagree. With screening 
by mammography, there is a divergence in clinical opinion and national guidelines 
over the same RCT evidence base. In the next section, I sketch out an alternative 
conceptual framework that could potentially advance the debate. 
 
Decision-analytic medicine and the role of modelling 
 
 
What sort of problem is posed by the question – ‘should we implement a 
mammography-based mass screening programme for breast cancer’? The EBM 
process interprets this as a scientific hypothesis that needs to be tested under 
controlled conditions; i.e. within a large-scale RCT. This interpretation struggles with 
the fact that the value of screening is affected by many factors, including the 
treatment options available, the target population, quality of service, and frequency of 
screening. This raises the issue of external validity in applying the result of a given 
trial – there is a ‘knowledge gap’ between the result of the RCT and the answer to the 
question posed above. We could tackle this issue by carrying multiple RCTs with 
varying protocols. This will not eliminate the problem, though – the time needed to 
carry out a definitive RCT raises the possibility that the results are obsolete by the 
time they become available.  
 
Instead, we can characterise the question as a problem of decision-making under 
uncertainty. The scientific method which EBM seeks to apply to medicine can be seen 
as a formalised process for the valid acquisition of knowledge. Similarly, we can talk 
about a formal methodology to validate the making of difficult decisions – decision 
methodology. There have been many and varied attempts to formalise such a 
methodology. However, there are general principles and concepts that tend reappear 
in different decision methodologies. We can illustrate these principles by applying 
them to the specific problem faced here – the evaluation of a proposed breast cancer 
screening programme.  
 
Any decision involves a choice between a set of mutually exclusive options. Formal 
approaches to decision-making require that these options are made explicit. This may 
not be a trivial exercise, as decisions can often be broken down into combinations of 
choices. Our decision problem seemingly has two options – to screen or not to screen. 
If we choose to screen, however, this involves further decisions about who to screen, 
and how often. If we choose not to screen, there is an option to carry out further 
research, in order to revisit the decision in the future.  
 Once we have identified the options, we need to analyse the consequences of 
choosing each one.  It is important to identify all the relevant consequences of an 
option. To get a complete picture involves thinking about consequences in the 
broadest terms, and also examining carefully the link between immediate and indirect 
outcomes. With screening, the obvious consequence is the saving or prolonging of 
lives. However, there are other consequences – possible over-treatment, anxiety from 
false positive diagnoses, reassurance from participation, increased pressure on the 
time of specialist staff, and so on. Also, improved survival for cancer patients is not a 
direct consequence of screening. The direct consequence is the early detection of 
cancer in some patients. The relative impact on survival will depend on how early 
detection changes treatment choices and outcomes. It will also depend on the 
relationship between disease progression, onset of symptoms, and prognosis.  
 
Closely related to the analysis of consequences is the gathering of relevant evidence. 
A structured analysis of consequences will determine what evidence is relevant to the 
decision problem. Also, through gathering evidence, we may gain new insights into 
the consequences of the options being evaluated. Evidence is defined here in a broad 
sense. For our decision problem, it will include evidence from trials of 
mammography, but it will also include trials of breast cancer treatments, 
observational studies, health care databases, and scientific studies of the biological 
processes involved in breast cancer. The quality of a piece of evidence will influence 
the weight it plays in decision making, but it will not necessarily exclude it from the 
process.  
 
Having gathered evidence and analysed all the consequences of each option in our 
decision, we should be in a position to choose between them. There are several issues 
that arise at this stage. There may be a range of consequences that are quite different 
in nature, and different options may favour different outcomes. With screening, for 
example, consequences include extended life spans, pain and discomfort from medical 
interventions, psychological well-being, and lost productivity. We could approach this 
problem by choosing a key consequence to prioritise. However, the usual approach in 
decision methodology is to establish a common metric that can be used to quantify 
disparate consequences. Money, utility and QALYs are examples of such metrics. 
Then, it is possible to aggregate the positive and negative consequences of each 
option. 
 
An issue that almost always arises in a decision problem is uncertainty. Due to gaps or 
weaknesses in the evidence, and the general unpredictability of the real world, there 
will be a degree of uncertainty in our predictions of outcomes. An element of decision 
methodology is an approach to balancing risk and reward. The most well established 
approach for this is expected utility maximisation 28. 
 
The approach described above might seem a description of a self-evident process that 
is already included in current practice. Does it add to, or change, medical decision-
making in any way? One aspect in which it does is that it involves a more formal and 
structured approach than is currently used. Key to this is the use of mathematical 
models. These models can be used to describe the decision itself, or aspects of the 
problem such as the natural history of a disease. The benefit of this is that it highlights 
complex aspects of the decision process, such as the dependence of screening on 
treatment. Also, a model provides a structure to synthesis a broad range of evidence. 
The value of this is discussed below.  
 
Another important affect of the approach described here lies in the treatment of 
information and uncertainty. The scientific method on which EBM is based is 
designed to drive out uncertainty by performing well-designed experiments. Hence 
EBM is interpreted to involve establishing the effectiveness of an intervention beyond 
reasonable doubt (defined through significance levels in statistical hypothesis testing) 
before it is introduced into practice. This ignores the feasibility, practical difficulties 
and costs of obtained enough information to reduce uncertainty to the required level. 
In the case of cancer screening programmes, as we have seen, these are likely to be 
substantial.  
 
However, we can apply the decision methodology described above to the sub-problem 
of decision uncertainty. This approach is known as ‘value-of-information’ analysis 29. 
It involves recognising that we are rarely in a state of complete ignorance prior to a 
proposed experiment. The choice of whether or not to conduct a trial can be seen as a 
decision problem. The outcome of conducting the trial will either be that it changes 
the original decision over implementing a treatment, or that it doesn’t. The expected 
impact of the new (or better) study in influencing the decision can be weighed against 
its costs. Note that any delay to implementing an intervention that turns out to be 
beneficial whilst we wait for conclusive proof is a cost of obtaining that proof. 
Chilcott et al discuss in depth the application of this approach to the prioritisation of 
clinical trials 30. 
 
This approach reflects a key conceptual difference between EBM and decision-
analytic medicine (DAM) – the response to uncertainty. EBM seeks to eliminate 
uncertainty, whereas DAM seeks to quantify it. DAM relies on modelling to do this. 
Through a well-constructed model, a broad evidence base can be synthesised to get 
the best possible representation of current knowledge. This is crucial to predicting the 
likely outcomes of further experiments, and estimating the marginal enhancement to 
our knowledge base. This process is most valuable where gathering strong evidence is 
expensive and time-consuming, as is often the case with cancer screening 
programmes. 
 
DAM represents an approach that strengthens the link between medical decision-
making and its goal – making the best decisions for patients. It represents a more 
sophisticated approach to the uncertainty of medicine than the arbitrary thresholds of 
significance used in conventional hypothesis testing. However, its use outside the 
field of health economics is limited. This may be because its approach to uncertainty 
is seen as unethical – that it is wrong for clinicians to offer treatment if they are not 
completely sure of its value. My discussion so far presents the counterargument that 
there can still be a significant degree of uncertainty for patients, or sub-groups of 
patients, after RCT evidence has been obtained. DAM makes this uncertainty an 
explicit part of the decision-making process.  
 
Modelling is a key part of DAM. We represent our understanding of the decision 
problem through building a model. This allows us to interpret and synthesise all the 
available evidence. It does this because, in building the model, we extract from the 
problem its key elements. We can then translate these elements, and the relationships 
between them, into a formal mathematical structure. This process of abstraction and 
formalisation is an essential part of any attempt to understand the world. However, it 
creates a problem which goes some way to explain why the DAM-type approach is 
largely restricted to health economics. The choice of which elements to include in the 
model, and how to represent them, is a subjective one. If it is done poorly, the analysis 
derived from the model is suspect. The challenge for those who wish to see a greater 
role for decision science in evidence-based medicine is to develop a formal 
methodology to ensure a close relationship between the model and the clinical 
problem. 
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